Critical elements of public infrastructure remain vulnerable to disasters, natural or man made. In particular, because of the ad hoc nature of the development of the U.S. power grid, critical elements of power infrastructure, from generation sources, to large step-up and step-down transformers, to smaller, local transformers, remain vulnerable to natural calamity or intentional sabotage. A power-down condition at any of these critical nodes in the grid can result in widespread, persistent power outages. By way of example, in September of 2011, human error by a single electrical linesman working in western Arizona knocked out power to the greater San Diego area, parts of northern Mexico, and parts of southwestern Arizona, leaving more than 3 million people without power. This error was unintentional, and at a point source, but caused an area wide disruption. Traffic snarled and surface transportation grid-lock resulted.
A more important concern is what happens when an area wide disruption, natural or man-made, shuts down the electrical grid on an even wider basis. Because of the interconnected nature of the U.S. power grid, and the long distances involved between generation points and highly-populated areas of use, the U.S. power grid is uniquely vulnerable to outages. The chaos caused by widespread and persistent power outrages due to weather events, such as Katrina and Sandy is well documented. However, other risks to the grid exist. For example, astronomical events astronomical events, such as the March 1989 solar storm over Quebec, and other natural disasters, such as large western wild lands fires, have all played a roll in widespread blackouts. As global climate change adds energy to the weather system, extreme weather events are expected to pose an increasing challenge to the resiliency of the U.S. power grid. The power grid is also, unfortunately, susceptible to human sabotage. Both cyber attacks, and physical attacks at key elements of grid infrastructure, could affect millions of power users.
It is difficult to overstate the importance of a resilient power grid to well-ordered, modern life. Modern transportation systems are entirely dependent on reliable power delivery. If traffic signals are lost due to an electricity outage, traffic grid-lock ensues, and as a result, first responders cannot move effectively to provide needed assistance, people cannot move to safer areas nor, if necessary, evacuate in a timely manner. Similar vulnerabilities exist with regard to the modern cellular communications network. Like traffic signals, cellular transmit/receive towers and relay stations also are dependent upon a constant source of electricity, without which, the communication system rapidly degrades. During any widespread natural or human cause disaster, use of cellular communications infrastructure spikes, which increases the need for a reliable cellular network in times of disaster.
Currently, most surface transportation signals lack back-up power systems. Certain conventional infrastructure (e.g., traffic signals, larger cellular transmit/receive towers, and smaller cellular relays) is protected by so-called uninterruptable power systems or “UPS”, which are either battery-based or include generators that come on-line automatically when a loss of grid power is sensed. However, UPS, as currently implemented, is actually time-limited power and is not truly uninterruptible. The reality is that most UPS systems have a very limited time within they will provide power with which a system can continue to function. Once the stored energy of the battery is exhausted or the fuel tank of the generator is empty, the backup power shuts off and so does the device that the UPS is supporting. A more accurate description of these systems is that of a “time-limited” backup power supply.
Moreover, conventional infrastructure power backup systems make attractive targets for thievery and sabotage. Gasoline or diesel generators, which are often used to supply backup power to critical traffic signals, are routinely stolen during natural disasters. For example, during the eastern storm in the U.S. known as “Derecho” occurring on Jun. 29, 2012, which had effects lasting through July 6th, generators installed specifically to power intersection signal lights were reported to have been stolen from a number of locations. This behavior is not limited to the U.S. In Brazil, theft of solar panels is common, and a director of British Telecom noted that plans to provide cell relay stations in the UK with battery backup systems (BBS) would likely suffer from battery thefts. Thus, simply mounting photovoltaic (PV) panels or installing generators at intersections or along rights-of-way does not provide an adequate solution. Visible solar panels or generators are targets for theft, especially during periods of prolonged electrical outages, when such equipment is particular valuable to individuals.